the cogito: indubitability without knowledge?
Clicks: 115
ID: 167051
2009
How should we understand both the nature, and the epistemic potential, of Descartes’s Cogito? Peter Slezak’s interpretation of the Cogito’s nature sees it strictly as a selfreferential kind of denial: Descartes cannot doubt that he is doubting. And what epistemic implications flow from this interpretation of the Cogito? We find that there is a consequent lack of knowledge being described by Descartes: on Cartesian grounds, indubitability is incompatible with knowing. Even as the Cogito halts doubt, therefore, it fails to be knowledge.
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hetherington2009principia:the
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| Authors | ;Stephen Hetherington |
| Journal | acta crystallographica section e, crystallographic communications |
| Year | 2009 |
| DOI | DOI not found |
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